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Abstract. Epidemic spreading occurs among animals, humans, or com-
puters and causes substantial societal, personal, or economic losses if left
undetected. Based on known temporal contact networks, we propose an
outbreak detection method that identifies a small set of nodes such that
the likelihood of detecting recent outbreaks is maximal. The two-step
procedure involves i) simulating spreading scenarios from all possible
seed configurations and ii) greedily selecting nodes for monitoring in or-
der to maximize the detection likelihood. We find that the detection
likelihood is a submodular set function for which it has been proven that
greedy optimization attains at least 63% of the optimal (intractable)
solution. The results show that the proposed method detects more out-
breaks than benchmark methods suggested recently and is robust against
badly chosen parameters. In addition, our method can be used for out-
break source detection. A limitation of this method is its heavy use of
computational resources. However, for large graphs the method could be
easily parallelized.
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1 Introduction
Spreading processes on networks can occur in various contexts, such as infectious
disease spreading among humans or animals [3, 14], computer virus spreading
over the internet [13], or misinformation spreading in online social networks [5].
In those examples, the spreading process can have disastrous consequences and
stopping it effectively is of great importance. For example, if the spread of a
new infectious disease remains undetected, it can grow into a global pandemic.
Likewise, the undetected spread of misinformation, can have significant financial
or political consequences. In some cases, however, the spreading phenomenon
can be seen as desirable, such as in the case of viral marketing [8]. Whether
desired or harmful, the mentioned examples are conceptually similar and share
the idea that a network of physical or virtual contacts acts as the substrate for
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the spreading process. While much of the past research considers static contact
networks, a recent surge in research focusing on temporal contact networks sheds
light on the importance of temporal structure for spreading processes (e.g., [14]).
Several attempts have been made to select nodes for optimal outbreak de-
tection. Most notably, in their seminal work, Leskovec et al. [10] propose a near-
optimal outbreak detection strategy that is based on selecting a small set of
nodes for monitoring using greedy optimization. Leskovec et al. focus on three
optimization objectives: detection likelihood, time until detection, and the pop-
ulation that is affected by an outbreak. While their approach works well in
a static water distribution network, where edges do not change over time, it
presents a critical shortcoming when applied to a temporal blog network where
bloggers post and repost stories. In that case, Leskovec et al. identify nodes for
sensor placement based on past (observed) data which are then used to detect
future outbreaks. However, the generalizability to future data can be unsatisfac-
tory, especially if the topology of the underlying temporal network is changing
rapidly [3, 10]. Another study suggests that central nodes tend to be infected
sooner and, therefore, monitoring them may be an effective strategy [6]. Finally,
Bajardi et al. [3] suggest monitoring so called sentinel nodes, i.e., nodes exhibit-
ing both a large probability of being infected and little uncertainty about the
seed node of the outbreak. The last two methods may lead to unsatisfactory re-
sults as they do not involve optimizing the set of nodes selected but are instead
based on heuristics.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of outbreak detection for epidemic
spreading in temporal contact networks. The central premise of this work is
that an outbreak can start at any time and from any node within a certain time
period. On a given day, we aim to identify a (small) set of k nodes for monitoring
such that the probability of detecting an outbreak that started anywhere within
the past b days is maximal. Since monitoring resources are typically scarce, the
optimal solution of monitoring all nodes in the network is not feasible. Hence,
k is set such that it matches the available monitoring resources. Our approach
can be divided into two steps: i) extensive Monte-Carlo simulations of outbreak
scenarios for every possible seed configuration in the window over the past b
days using a propagation model and ii) greedy optimization of the detection
likelihood. An optional third step extends our method to the problem of outbreak
source detection (e.g. [2]). Here, we use the stochastic version of the well-known
susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model [4] as the propagation model but our
approach can be used with any propagation model. Our contributions can then
be summarized as follows:
– We introduce a novel method for outbreak detection in temporal networks
that combines extensive outbreak simulations and greedy optimization in
order to maximize the likelihood of detecting recent outbreaks (Sect. 4). We
show that the method extends to the problem of source detection (Sect. 4.3).
– We show that the detection likelihood of a set of nodes is a submodular set
function for which greedy optimization is guaranteed to achieve at least 63%
of the optimal solution (Sect. 4.2).
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– Finally, we evaluate our method on two temporal networks: an undirected
network describing sexual contacts in Brazil [14] and a directed network
describing pig movements in Switzerland. We show that our method outper-
forms previously suggested heuristics [3, 6]. Moreover, we provide evidence
that it is robust against badly chosen parameters (Sect. 5).
2 Related Work
One of the early works suggesting greedy optimization of submodular set func-
tions for optimal node selection is Kempe et al. [8], who consider the problem
of maximizing the spread of influence in social networks. This work has been
extended to dynamic networks by Aggarwal et al. [1] and more recently, the use
of real diffusion cascades instead of simulated ones has been suggested [12]. The
problem of influence maximization is conceptually similar to outbreak detection.
In the case of influence maximization, the goal is to select nodes such that the
size of the spreading cascades originating from those nodes is maximal, whereas
for outbreak detection, the goal is to select nodes such that we catch as many
spreading cascades as possible. Much of the research in the field of outbreak
detection goes back to the seminal work by Leskovec et al. [10], who not only
optimize detection likelihood, but also detection time and the share of the pop-
ulation that is affected by an outbreak. Our approach differs from Leskovec et
al.’s approach [10] in that we optimize the set of nodes that we can monitor
on a given day, whereas Leskovec et al. optimize the set of nodes without ref-
erence to a given day. As a consequence, our approach does not apply to other
optimization goals, such as the detection time. The problem of outbreak detec-
tion has also been addressed in more heuristic ways. In [6], the authors make
use of the observation that central individuals are topologically closer to the
average individual in a network and are thus more likely to be infected early.
This provides the rationale for monitoring high (in-)degree individuals. Bajardi
et al. [3] propose sentinel nodes, i.e., nodes that are reached by outbreaks from
many different initial conditions. However, in contrast to our work, this approach
assumes that we know when an outbreak started and thus fails to address the
uncertainty about the temporal origin of an outbreak.
3 Problem Definition
Imagine that we organize information about contacts between individuals as a
directed or undirected time-stamped network G = (V,E) where V denotes the
set of nodes (individuals) and E the set of edges. An edge triple (vi, vj , t) ∈ E
consists of the two nodes vi, vj ∈ V and a time-stamp t indicating when the
contact happened. Note that in a directed network, the edge is directed from vi
to vj . We suspect that one single node introduced a disease that now spreads
along edges in the network. Furthermore, we assume that we know the underlying
propagation model. Here, we use the stochastic version of the SIS model [4] with a
probability p that a susceptible node gets infected upon contact with an infected
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node and the time until recovery µ−1 that indicates the number of time steps
until an infected individual recovers and becomes susceptible again. Our goal is
to identify an optimal set of nodes St ⊆ V at the time of monitoring t such that
the likelihood of detecting an outbreak that originated within a window over
the past b days is maximal. Since monitoring resources are typically restricted,
we introduce a maximal number of nodes k that can be monitored at a time.
Therefore, the optimization problem becomes:
max
St⊆V
DL(St) subject to |St| ≤ k , (1)
where DL(St) denotes the detection likelihood associated with the set of nodes
St, i.e., DL : St → [0, 1]. If we define A(s) to be the event that the node
s ∈ St detects the outbreak, we can write the detection likelihood as DL(St) =
P (∪s∈StA(s)). In other words, the detection likelihood corresponds to the prob-
ability that at least one of the nodes s ∈ St detects an outbreak (cf. Fig. 1 for
an example). We use the simplifying assumption that we detect an outbreak if
at least one of the nodes s ∈ St is infected at the date of monitoring.
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Fig. 1. a) Simple directed network with 4 nodes and 3 time-stamped edges. b) The
same network but now time-unrolled. The goal is to identify the optimal 2 nodes for
monitoring at t = 4. We assume a disease spreads as a susceptible–infectious (SI)
process (individuals do not recover) with p = 0.6. The outbreak can happen anywhere
within the time period t = 1, 2, 3 (b = 3). Assuming that all seed configurations are
equally likely to be the source, we get the detection probabilities in c). The node with
the highest probability to “see” an infection at t = 4 is N3. The optimal 2 nodes for
outbreak detection are N3 and N4.
4 Proposed Solution
Our solution first simulates outbreaks from every possible seed configuration (cf.
Sect. 4.1) and then uses the simulation results to optimally allocate monitoring
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resources to nodes (cf. Sect. 4.2). Optionally, a last step identifies the source of
the outbreak (cf. Sect. 4.3). Here, we discuss these steps in turn.
4.1 Step 1: Spreading Simulations
The first step of the solution consists of simulating outbreaks from every possible
seed node v0 at every possible starting time t0 within the window of length b.
For the simulation, we use the known parameters of the underlying propagation
process. As mentioned before, here, we focus on the SIS model with infection
probability p and recovery time µ−1. As a result, we get a large number n
of outbreak outcomes for every possible pair {v0, t0}, which can be used to
approximate the probability that a certain seed configuration {v0, t0} infects at
least one of the nodes in St, i.e., P (∪s∈StA(s) | {v0, t0}). In particular, we simply
count the number of simulation runs that infect at least one s ∈ St and divide
it by n. Note that for the sake of notation, we do not condition on the given
parameters of the SIS process. By marginalizing out the seed configurations, we
can compute the unconditional probability of detecting an outbreak, i.e.,
DL(St) = P (∪s∈StA(s))
=
∑
{v0,t0}
P (∪s∈StA(s) | {v0, t0}) P ({v0, t0}) . (2)
The running time for the simulation step is O(n b |V |) assuming the individual
simulation has cost 1. With |V | given by the network and the length of the
window b determined by epidemic characteristics, we need to choose the number
of simulations n such that the procedure is computationally feasible and results
in satisfactory approximations of the conditional probabilities. In order to ease
the greedy optimization step (Sect. 4.2), we transform the simulation results into
an inverted index, a data structure that facilitates fast lookups [10]. Also note
that if certain outbreak configurations {v0, t0} are more likely than others, we
can adjust the prior P ({v0, t0}) accordingly. By default, we use a uniform prior.
4.2 Step 2: Optimal Selection of Nodes for Monitoring
As stated in Sect. 3, we aim to identify a set of k nodes such that the detec-
tion likelihood is maximal. Solving such an optimization is NP-hard since the
number of possible sets St is prohibitively large [9]. For example, finding the
optimal 10 nodes in a small network of 50 nodes, would require evaluating over
10 billion different sets of nodes. However, we can make use of a famous result
by Nemhauser and Wolsey [9, 11], which states that for non-negative monotone
and submodular set functions, a set selected by greedy optimization is within
63% of the optimal but intractable solution.
Monotonicity of a set function F is defined as follows. For any two sets of
nodes A and B with A ⊆ B ⊆ V , it holds that F (A) ≤ F (B). Moreover, F is
submodular if it satisfies
F (A ∪ {v})− F (A) ≥ F (B ∪ {v})− F (B) . (3)
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for v ∈ V \ B. Intuitively, this means that adding a new node v to a smaller set
A results in a marginal gain at least as large as the one resulting from adding v
to B.
Theorem 1. The set function DL(St) is monotone and submodular.
Proof. As a probability, DL(St) is also a measure and thus monotone [15]. For
submodularity, we first note that a non-negative linear combination of sub-
modular set functions is submodular [9]. From (2), we can see that DL(St)
corresponds to a linear combination of probabilities P (∪s∈StA(s) | {v0, t0})
with weights P ({v0, t0}) ≥ 0. It thus remains to show that the probability
P (∪s∈StA(s) | {v0, t0}) is submodular. As mentioned in Sect. 4.1, this prob-
ability is estimated by counting how many of the n simulation runs (or cas-
cades) infect at least one s ∈ St. For the sake of notation, we will denote
P (∪s∈StA(s) | {v0, t0}) as F . Consider two sets of nodes A ⊆ B ⊆ V and a
node v ∈ V \ B. We can distinguish three cases: i) the new node v either detects
no new cascades or only detects cascades that are already detected by A and B.
In that case, F (A∪{v})−F (A) = 0 = F (B∪{v})−F (B). ii) the new node v de-
tects cascades that B detects, but not A. Then, F (A∪{v})−F (A) = F ({v}) ≥
0 = F (B ∪ {v})− F (B). iii) the new node v detects cascades that neither B nor
A detects. In that case, F (A ∪ {v}) − F (A) = F ({v}) = F (B ∪ {v}) − F (B).
Hence, in all possible cases the inequality in (3) is satisfied. This concludes the
proof. uunionsq
Based on Theorem 1, we can use the greedy optimization algorithm that simply
consists of iteratively adding the node that maximizes the marginal increase in
detection likelihood to the initially empty set St. The optimal set is found when
|St| = k. The complexity of the greedy optimization procedure is O(k|V |) if the
evaluation of the set function is considered a constant operation. Note that we
can improve the scalability of the algorithm with lazy forward evaluations that
have been suggested in [10].
4.3 Step 3 (optional): Outbreak Source Detection
Based on the simulation results from Sect. 4.1 and a set of observed infected
nodes, we can compute the source probability for every seed configuration. If we
denote the set of observed infected nodes at time t as It and we want to compute
the probability that {v∗0 , t∗0} was the source of this outbreak, we can use Bayes’
rule as follows,
P ({v∗0 , t∗0} | It) =
P (It | {v∗0 , t∗0}) P ({v∗0 , t∗0})∑
{v0,t0} P (It | {v0, t0}) P ({v0, t0})
. (4)
P (It | {v0, t0}) can be easily approximated by the relative number of simulation
runs that infect all nodes in It for a given seed configuration {v0, t0}. Typically,
we would assume a uniform prior P ({v0, t0}), i.e., all seed configurations are
equally likely a priori. However, it is possible to have different priors for different
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seed configurations. For example, we may know that more recent outbreaks are
more likely and, therefore, we set higher prior probabilities for more recent seed
configurations. Or, in case of an animal transport network, we surmise that
bigger farms are more likely to start an outbreak than smaller ones.
5 Evaluation
The primary goal of our evaluation is to show that our method is more effec-
tive than previously suggested methods and that it can be applied in practical
settings where, for example, wrong parameters are chosen for the propagation
model. We operationalize these claims with the following hypotheses:
– H1. Our method detects a higher fraction of outbreaks than state-of-the-art
methods. We specifically compare with methods that are based on central
nodes [6] or sentinel nodes [3], or that use past contact data to detect future
outbreaks [10].
– H2. Our method is robust against badly chosen parameters for the spreading
model.
In the remainder of this section, we introduce the datasets used in the evaluation
and then discuss the empirical results for each hypothesis.
5.1 Datasets
We evaluate our method with two different datasets. The first dataset —widely
used in work on temporal contact networks— describes time-stamped sexual
contacts between male sex-buyers and female sex-sellers [14] and thus corre-
sponds to an undirected bipartite network. We assume that this network acts
as the substrate for a spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). The full
dataset covers a period of 6 years between September 2002 and October 2008.
However, in what follows, we only show the results for the last 30 days of the
dataset (October 2008) such that b = 30. The results for other 30-day periods
are similar.1 The 30-day network we analyze consists of 1,573 nodes and 1,463
edges. Ignoring the temporal dimension, we find that the network consists of 257
connected components and is thus highly fragmented. The density is 0.1131%.
We refer to this network as the escort network.
The second dataset describes pig movements in Switzerland [16].2 Movements
are directed and time-stamped with the day of transport. Movements to slaugh-
terhouses are removed and we only consider the farm-to-farm network. Moreover,
as in [3], we ignore within-farm dynamics and simply consider a movement as
1We provide the dataset, the code, and additional results and figures under the
following link: https://github.com/martinSter/Outbreak-Detection.
2The pig movement data contain private information and cannot be shared publicly.
For research purposes, a data request can be sent to Identitas AG, Stauffacherstrasse
130A, 3014 Bern, Switzerland.
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a directed contact between two farms. As with the first dataset, we consider a
window of b = 30 days (October 2017) since this typically corresponds to the
silent spread phase, i.e., the time between introduction of a disease and its first
detection [7]. This 30-day network consists of 3,055 nodes 4,048 edges. Compared
to the first dataset, the density is 0.0360% and thus lower which is partly due
to the directionality of the second network. We refer to this network as the pig
network.
5.2 Hypothesis H1 (Comparison with Benchmarks)
Benchmark methods. In order to test H1, we use two benchmark methods that
have been suggested in the related work [3,6] and we additionally use a random
set of nodes as a baseline. The first benchmark method corresponds to selecting
nodes based on their (in-)degree. As stated in [6], we expect more central nodes,
i.e., nodes with a high (in-)degree, to be good indicators for detecting outbreaks.
The second benchmark method [3] identifies so called sentinels, i.e., nodes that
are reached by many different infection paths and that exhibit a low degree of
uncertainty with respect to the seed cluster. The method consists of two key
steps. First, a deterministic SIS process with infection probability p = 1 and
recovery time µ−1 yields all possible infection paths starting from any node
at some time t0. In a second step, all seed nodes with similar infection paths,
measured by the Jaccard index (threshold of 0.8 as in [3]), are grouped into
seed clusters. We adjust their approach to our setting by using a SIS instead
of a SIR model. We expect the method of Bajardi et al. [3] to perform worse
than our method for three reasons: i) their method only considers outbreaks
starting at the beginning of the considered period and thus fails to address the
fact that an outbreak can start at any time, ii) their method trades some of the
outbreak detection power for lower uncertainty about the seed of the outbreak,
and iii) their method is heuristic and does not maximize an objective function.
Since their method does not uniquely focus on outbreak detection, we adjust it
slightly and define sentinels as the nodes that are reached most often by infection
paths, hereby neglecting the uncertainty criteria.
Methodology. In order to test our method, we stochastically simulate 10,000
outbreak scenarios with a random seed node and starting time within the 30
days considered. We assume that the disease propagates according to a SIS
model with known infection probability p = 0.6 and recovery time µ−1 = 15
days. The same parameter values are used in Step 1 of our method to simulate
n = 1,000 spreading simulations from every seed configuration {v0, t0}. Since
both networks have a temporal resolution of one day, the order of contacts of
an individual on a given day is not known and, therefore, we assume that there
is no same-day-spread from individuals with multiple contacts on a given day.
With the greedy optimization procedure outlined in Step 2 of our method, we
find k optimal nodes for monitoring. To compare the different methods, we count
the number of detected outbreaks for varying k. Our method is implemented in
Python 3.6 and is executed on a Intel Core i7 machine (1.80GHz) with 16GB
Outbreak Detection in Temporal Networks 9
RAM. The execution time is about 22 minutes for both the escort and pig
network. Note however, that this may vary depending on the parametrization of
the propagation model.
Results. Figure 2 presents the fraction of detected outbreaks for both networks.
It is apparent that our method (greedy max.) performs better compared to the
different benchmark methods in both data sets (of different sizes) and coincides
with the expected detection likelihood (dashed line), which can be computed
by plugging the k optimal nodes into (2). If k is small, high (in-) degree nodes
achieve a similar detection quality because our approach initially selects mostly
high-degree nodes. For larger k, the curves diverge as the greedy selection ap-
proach allocates monitoring resources to more remote parts of the network in
order to maximize detection likelihood. As expected, sentinel nodes detect sub-
stantially fewer outbreaks but still perform better than the random node set.
However, note that even with k = 100 our approach results in a detection likeli-
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Fig. 2. Fraction of detected outbreaks for the escort network (left) and the pig network
(right). The error bars represent ± one standard deviation. The disease propagates
according to a SIS model with p = 0.6 and µ−1 = 15 days.
hood of only roughly 14% and 7% for the escort and the pig network, respectively.
Two factors contribute to these results. First, as seen in Sect. 5.1, both networks
are highly fragmented, making outbreak detection difficult. Second, depending
on the concrete parametrization, there is a considerable fraction of outbreak sce-
narios that die out before they could even be detected at the monitoring date.
If we skew our analysis to outbreaks that are still active at the monitoring date,
the fraction of detected outbreaks increases to 20% in the escort network and
to 13% in the pig network, both for k = 100. We can go even further and only
consider outbreaks with a certain minimal size. To this end, we again simulate
outbreak scenarios for the escort network based on a SIS model with p = 0.6
and µ−1 = 15. For every minimal outbreak size, we simulate 3,000 scenarios and
count the number of outbreaks that the different methods (with k = 10 nodes)
detect. Figure 4 (left) shows that all methods detect larger outbreaks more effec-
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tively in the escort network. Our method detects more than half of all outbreaks
that involve at least 5 nodes at the time of monitoring. This makes sense for two
reasons: First, the more nodes that are affected, the more likely it is that one
of the nodes is in our set of monitored nodes. Second, larger outbreaks tend to
happen in more connected parts of the network where our method is better at
detecting outbreaks.
Next, we compare the optimal node sets from Fig. 2 with node sets that
were selected based on 5 previous 30-day periods. If the contact patterns in
the networks were roughly constant, we would expect a similar performance
for node sets chosen based on previous data. However, Fig. 3 shows that the
performance is generally worse if we use nodes selected based on previous 30-
day periods. Interestingly, for the pig network the node set that is closest to
the reference period (October 2017) is the one selected based on June 2017.
Additionally considering the node set based on February 2017 reveals that the
pig network may exhibit some 4-month seasonalities that are associated with the
production cycle in the pig industry. Overall, however, those findings imply that
contact patterns vary significantly and node sets chosen based on past data do
not generalize well for the two networks considered here.
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Fig. 3. Fraction of detected outbreaks with corresponding error bars for the escort
network (left) and the pig network (right). The performance of the reference period
(October) is compared to optimal node sets based on previous 30-day periods.
Finally, our method not only serves as an outbreak detection mechanism, it
also detects the source of an outbreak given a sample of infected nodes at the time
of monitoring. In order to test the source detection extension, we simulate 1,000
large outbreak scenarios (at least 8 infected nodes at the time of monitoring)
according to the SIS model parametrized as above. We then randomly pick 1,
2, and 3 nodes from the simulated infection cascades as observed infected nodes
and compute the posterior distribution according to (4), using a uniform prior.
Note that for every possible source node, we sum the posterior probabilities over
the different starting times in order to get an aggregated source probability per
node. Figure 4 (right) shows the results. If we only observe one infected node,
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the accuracy of the prediction is unsatisfactory because in more than half of
all simulated outbreaks the true source is not ranked among the five top nodes.
However, for two or three observed infected nodes, the accuracy of the source
detection improves substantially. For example, we detect the source perfectly in
more than 30% of all cases if we observe 3 infected nodes.
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Fig. 4. Fraction of detected outbreaks with corresponding error bars for 10 nodes and
varying minimal outbreak size (left). Source detection quality with varying numbers
of nodes observed (right).
5.3 Hypothesis H2 (Robustness)
Methodology. In order to test H2, we use our method (Step 1 and 2) to identify
nodes with the true underlying infection probability p = 0.6 as well as with
misspecified probabilities p = {0.1, 0.3, 0.9}, keeping µ−1 = 15 fixed. Likewise,
we identify monitoring nodes with the true underlying recovery time µ−1 = 15
as well as with misspecified µ−1 = {5, 30}, keeping p = 0.6 fixed. We simulate
10,000 outbreak scenarios based on the SIS model with the true underlying values
of p = 0.6 and µ−1 = 15 and compare the fraction of detected outbreaks.
Results. Our method seems to be robust against misspecified infection probabil-
ities p. The fraction of detected outbreaks in the escort network is only slightly
smaller if we use nodes found based on misspecified values of p (Fig. 5, left).
However, the detection performance can deteriorate considerably if µ−1 is mis-
specified (Fig. 5, right). Note that the decrease in detection likelihood is more
significant if µ−1 is smaller than the true value. This makes sense intuitively as
assuming a too small µ−1 will neglect many possible infection paths.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
The goal of this work is to identify a small set of nodes for monitoring such that
the likelihood of detecting recent outbreaks in temporal networks is maximized.
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Fig. 5. Fraction of detected outbreaks with corresponding error bars for the escort
network when the infection probability p (left) or the recovery period µ−1 (right) is
misspecified.
Based on an evaluation with two different datasets, we find that our method
outperforms other methods and it is especially effective for detecting large out-
breaks. Moreover, it is robust with respect to the choice of parameters in the
SIS model, as long as a large enough recovery time is chosen. Additionally, our
method naturally extends to the problem of infection source detection. Although
we restrict our examples to the SIS model, our method can be used with any
propagation model that can be simulated. The findings reported here are crucial
for the development of new outbreak detection strategies because our approach
performs well in different contexts and applies to the realistic scenario where, on
a given day, we need to find the optimal individuals to monitor. Moreover, our
method is derived from basic concepts in probability theory rather than based on
heuristics. The major limitation of our method compared to heuristics suggested
previously is its computational intensity that can be prohibitive for large net-
works. However, the expensive simulation procedure could be easily parallelized.
Another limitation of our method is that it only applies to the maximization of
the detection likelihood. Other maximization objectives, such as the detection
time, cannot be transferred easily to our problem. Further experiments, using
different datasets and more complex propagation models, are an essential next
step in confirming the generalizability of this method. Overall, we are convinced
that our method can be an invaluable tool in a practical disease surveillance
context.
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